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any states are considering programs that
would provide vouchers for (low-income)
children to attend private schools because
policymakers believe that traditional
reforms—such as reducing class sizes—will not fix an
educational system that is “broken.” Advocates of vouchers
argue that teachers’ unions and bloated bureaucracies
impede such reforms from reaching the classroom and
increasing student achievement. Furthermore, because
children are required to attend their neighborhood school,
the system has no incentive to change. Wealthier parents
can voice dissatisfaction with their residential school by
moving to another neighborhood or enrolling their
children in a private school; however, poorer—particularly
inner-city—parents cannot. Vouchers would, at a minimum,
provide disadvantaged children with more educational
options. If the students also received a better education in
the private schools, the program might offer a cost-effective
way to improve student achievement, at least for those
students who use the vouchers.
In 1990, Wisconsin became the first state in the
nation to implement a publicly funded school voucher
program. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program provides
a voucher, worth approximately $4,373 in 1996-97, to
low-income students to attend nonsectarian private
schools. The program began with seven private schools,
although by 1996 the number had risen to twenty.1 At this
time, religious schools are not permitted to participate in
the program.2 The participating private schools offer a
variety of educational approaches, including Montessori
and Waldorf, as well as bilingual and African-American
cultural emphases. Although the tuition charged by many
of the “choice” schools is quite low (ranging from less than
$200 to about $4,000), actual expenditures per pupil are
generally higher (on the order of $4,000 to $5,000 per
pupil in 1996-97).3 The balance of the revenues comes
from grants, donations, and fund-raising by parents. In
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addition, because the schools are nonsectarian, many also
receive Title I funding from the federal government.
Because the parental choice program is targeted to
the most disadvantaged public school students, only
students whose family income is at or below 1.75 times the
national poverty line are eligible. In principle, the student
in a family of three with a family income of approximately
$21,000 is eligible to apply; in practice, the mean family
income of applicants is approximately $12,300. Choice
applicants are considerably more disadvantaged than the
average student in the Milwaukee public schools (whose
family income is $24,000); they are also more likely to be
minority and have lower preapplication math and reading
test scores. However, the parental education of choice
applicants is comparable to that of nonapplicants.
Some argue that an unrestricted voucher program
would improve the schooling of all children. In the most
unrestricted program, all (or a substantial percentage) of
the students in the public schools would be eligible to
attend a private school. Since state funding would be tied
to student enrollments, public schools would have to
compete for students, as in the marketplace, which would
give the schools an incentive to improve. If such an
unrestricted voucher program were successful, the
academic outcomes of students in public and private
schools would equalize over the long run. While such
effects are theoretically possible, the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program is too small to provide insight into the
potential student achievement benefits of an unrestricted
voucher program.4 It cannot show whether providing
vouchers would also improve the schooling of students who
remain in the public schools. An analysis of the Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program can, however, indicate whether
the private schools participating in the program (the choice
schools) are “better” than the public schools in Milwaukee.
In this paper, I review the three existing studies of
the effects of the choice schools on student achievement.
Two of the studies report significant gains in math for
the choice students and two report no significant effects
in reading. I also extend the analysis to compare the
achievement of students in the choice schools with that of
students in three different types of public schools: regular
attendance area schools, citywide (or magnet) schools, and
attendance area schools with small class sizes and supple-
mental funding from the state of Wisconsin (“P-5” schools).
The results suggest that students in P-5 schools have math
test score gains similar to those in the choice schools, and that
students in the P-5 schools outperform students in the choice
schools in reading. In contrast, students in the citywide
schools score no differently than students in the regular
attendance area schools in both math and reading. Given that
the pupil-teacher ratios in the P-5 and choice schools are
significantly smaller than those in the other public schools,
one potential explanation for these results is that students
perform well in schools with smaller class sizes.
EXISTING STUDIES OF THE ACHIEVEMENT 
EFFECTS OF THE CHOICE PROGRAM
Three studies to date have evaluated the achievement
effects of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. The first,
conducted by Witte, Sterr, and Thorn (1995), concludes
that there were no relative achievement gains among the
choice students (see also Witte [1997]). The second, by
Greene, Peterson, and Du (1997), finds that the choice
students made statistically significant test score gains in
both reading and math by their third and fourth years in
the program. The third study, by Rouse (forthcoming),
reports that the students selected to attend a choice school
experienced significantly faster gains in math scores, but
showed no differential gains in reading. To understand why
these three studies generated conflicting results, one must
consider two aspects of the evaluations: the selection of
the control, or comparison, group and the method of
controlling for family background and student ability.
SELECTION OF THE CONTROL,
OR COMPARISON, GROUP
Ideally, to establish whether choice schools are better than
the Milwaukee public schools, one must ascertain whether
students who attended the choice schools had higher
achievement gains than they would have had if they had
attended a Milwaukee public school. Because this counter-
factual is impossible to obtain, one must instead identify a
group of students who did not attend a choice school; theirFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 63
test scores provide the yardstick against which to measure
the effect of the program. This group is called a control, or
comparison, group.5 The best control group is constructed
using a randomized experiment. In this social experiment,
children are randomly assigned to attend a choice school
(the treatment group), while others are assigned to attend
public schools (the control group). After some period of
time, one would compare outcomes—such as test scores,
high school graduation rates, or labor market success—for
the treatment and control groups. Since, on average, the
only difference between the groups would be their initial
assignment—which was randomly determined—any dif-
ferences in outcomes could be attributed to the type of
school attended.
Such an experiment, however, was not imple-
mented in Milwaukee (nor anywhere else), forcing
researchers to devise statistical methods that attempt to
mimic a randomized experiment. One cannot simply
compare the achievement of students in choice schools with
that of a comparison group of students in the Milwaukee
public schools. In Milwaukee, this simple comparison
would likely show that students enrolled in choice schools
fare no better than students in the Milwaukee public
schools.6 One might be tempted to conclude that the
choice schools are no different than the public schools.
However, such an interpretation might be misleading.
Students who qualify for the parental choice program come
from disadvantaged families. As a result, they generally
score lower on standardized tests than wealthier, more
advantaged students and would likely have continued to do
so even if they had remained in the public schools. One
would attribute the test score results to the schools when the
results may, in fact, be due to the characteristics of the
students. To estimate the true effect of the choice schools, one
must control for family background (such as family income
and parental education) and student ability. The goal is to
control for all individual characteristics that are correlated
with attending the choice school and to explain the higher test
scores in such a way that the only difference between the two
groups of students is enrollment in a choice school. In general,
the more similar the two groups are to begin with, the more
credible the evaluation of the program will be.
The choice of a control, or comparison, group is
one area in which the existing analyses of the Milwaukee
voucher program differ. Greene, Peterson, and Du (1997)
compare the test scores of choice students with those of the
group of students who applied to the program but were not
accepted (the “unsuccessful applicants”); Witte, Sterr, and
Thorn (1995) compare choice students with a random
sample of students from the Milwaukee public schools; and
Rouse (forthcoming) compares selected choice students
with both the unsuccessful applicants and the students in
the Milwaukee public schools. There are advantages and
disadvantages to both control/comparison groups.
The unsuccessful applicants are an appealing
control group because all of these students were interested
in attending a choice school. Therefore, the unsuccessful
applicants likely have parents who are similarly motivated
to the parents of the successful applicants. In addition, the
parents of all applicants must expect that their children
will be well served in the program, which may not be true
for the children who did not apply. There are problems
with using the unsuccessful applicants as a control group,
however. The first is that since the parents of all applicants
were interested in enrolling their children in a private
school, the parents of the unsuccessful applicants may have
been more likely to enroll their children in a private school
outside of the choice program, rather than re-enrolling
them in a Milwaukee public school. This decision was made
easier by a parallel, privately funded program—Partners
for Advancing Values in Education (PAVE)—that provided
scholarships to students interested in attending (primarily)
Catholic schools. If post-application data on these students
were available, this would not be a problem. However, the
data do not track students who enrolled in either a public
school outside of the Milwaukee public school system or a
nonchoice private school. The second problem is that the
sample sizes are extremely small. By the fourth year of the
program, there were fewer than forty unsuccessful appli-
cants to use in evaluating the program, which makes
estimated effects of the program sensitive to unusually
high or low test scores (Witte 1997).
One can also compare the achievement of students
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students from the Milwaukee public schools. This compar-
ison group yields a much larger sample and is, perhaps, less
subject to nonrandom attrition (after all, these students
were ostensibly not interested in leaving the Milwaukee
public schools). At the same time, the random sample of
students from the Milwaukee public schools may have
refrained from applying to the parental choice program
because they thought it would not serve them well, or
because their parents are less motivated or involved, which
would lead to an overstatement of the achievement effects
of the program. As a result, using this comparison group
requires a statistical strategy that adequately controls for
student characteristics.
METHOD OF CONTROLLING FOR STUDENT
CHARACTERISTICS AND FAMILY BACKGROUND
The second area in which the existing analyses of the
Milwaukee program differ is the method of controlling for
family background and student ability. Greene, Peterson,
and Du (1997) control for “application lotteries”; Witte,
Sterr, and Thorn (1995) control for the student’s prior test
scores; and Rouse (forthcoming) controls for “individual
fixed effects.” Again, each methodology has advantages and
disadvantages.
Consider first the strategy employed by Greene,
Peterson, and Du. The choice schools are not allowed to
discriminate in admitting students, which is interpreted to
mean that if more students apply for the school than there
are seats available, the students are randomly selected from
among the applicants. If a choice school is not oversub-
scribed, it is required to take all who apply, with only a few
exclusions. Therefore, in each school in which students
are randomly selected (through an application lottery), a
mini-randomized experiment is conducted. If the schools
truly select the students at random, then, on average, the
only difference between the successful and unsuccessful
applicants is whether they have been randomly selected. As
a result, in theory, one could simply compare the outcomes
of successful applicants with the outcomes of unsuccessful
applicants and attribute the difference to whether the
students were selected to attend a choice school. Moreover,
because selection was random (that is, not related to student
ability or parental background), one need not control for
individual characteristics.7 One can also combine all of
these mini-experiments and control for variables indicating
the application lottery in which each student participated.8
(Naturally, this strategy requires using the unsuccessful
applicants as a control, or comparison, group.) The primary
advantage of using the unsuccessful applicants as a control
group and controlling for application lotteries is that, if
selection is truly random, this strategy should uncover the
true effect of the parental choice program on student test
scores using a method that closely resembles a randomized
experiment, at least in theory.
In practice, this strategy has some disadvantages.
First, the data do not contain information on the actual
school(s) to which a student applied. As a result, one cannot
recover the actual application lotteries. Greene, Peterson, and
Du have devised a creative solution to this problem, but it is
not clear how close their imputation comes to the actual
lotteries.9 A second disadvantage is that even if the
lotteries are truly random and the imputation reasonably
mimics them, it appears that the motivated unsuccessful
applicants were more likely to attend another private school—
one outside of the choice program (Rouse forthcoming; Witte
1997). As a result, by not controlling for family background,
one may overstate the effectiveness of the program.
There are also advantages and disadvantages to
controlling for prior test scores—the methodology imple-
mented by Witte, Sterr, and Thorn. On the one hand,
controlling for these scores has the advantage of accounting
for student ability that changes over time, rather than
controlling for characteristics at a fixed point in time. In
addition, this methodology allows one to develop a
dynamic model of test score growth in which a child’s test
score this year is a direct function of his or her test score
last year. On the other hand, test scores may not be a good
measure of ability (even ability at a fixed point in time).
Moreover, the strategy may not be appropriate when
applied to data on students who have been enrolled in a
choice school for several years (Rouse forthcoming). Finally,
one can only include students who have prior test scores in
the analysis, which is a potential problem in Milwaukee,
where the majority of students are not tested each year.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 65
The strategy implemented by Rouse (forthcoming)
controls for all student characteristics (both observed and
unobserved) that do not change over time (that is, they are
fixed, or time-invariant). These characteristics include
more motivated parents, parental education, and innate
student ability. The methodology is referred to as control-
ling for individual fixed effects. This strategy requires
fewer assumptions than one using application lotteries and
allows for larger samples than one controlling for prior test
scores. Its primary disadvantage, however, is that it does
not control for time-varying student characteristics.
To understand this strategy (which I employ in the
rest of the paper), consider two students: Student A, who
enrolled in a choice school, and Student B, who did not.
The diagram depicts two possible test score trajectories for
the two students before Student A enrolled in the choice program
(see box).10 Suppose that the prechoice test scores of
Student A and Student B evolve as shown in the left
portion of the diagram. Here, Student A scored higher
than Student B each year before Student A enrolled in the
program. This may reflect the fact that Student A was
more “able” than Student B, and one would not want to
attribute the test score difference to the choice schools
since it existed even before Student A enrolled in the
choice program and it would likely have continued to exist
even if Student A had remained in a Milwaukee public
school. Fortunately, in this case the fixed-effects analysis
will uncover the true (unbiased, in statistical terms) effect
of the choice schools on student achievement.
The fixed-effects analysis will, however, lead to an
overstatement of the program’s effects if Student A had
faster test score gains than Student B before Student A
enrolled in the choice program. In this case (shown in the
right portion of the diagram), the fixed-effects analysis will
attribute the faster achievement growth to the choice
program when, in reality, students in the choice program
would have had faster test score growth even if they had
remained in the Milwaukee public schools. To assess
whether this potential problem likely explains the entire
estimated program effect, I analyzed the preapplication test
score trajectories of students in the choice program and
those in the Milwaukee public schools. This exercise
indicated that the results obtained using individual fixed-
effects estimates are probably not overstated.
Student A is enrolled in a choice school and Student B is enrolled in a Milwaukee public school. Consider their test scores before
Student A enrolled in the choice program:
UNDERSTANDING INDIVIDUAL FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATES
Individual fixed-effects estimates will overstate the
effect if Student A had faster test score gains even before he or
she enrolled in the choice program.
Individual fixed-effects estimates will generate the
true effect if both Student A and Student B had the same growth
in test scores before Student A enrolled in the choice program.
Test score




Years in school before Student A enrolled in the choice program
Student A
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ARE THE PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE CHOICE 
PROGRAM “BETTER” THAN THE
MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS?
COMPARING CHOICE SCHOOLS WITH
ALL MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Chart 1 compares the test scores of students selected to
attend a choice school with those of both the unsuccessful
applicants and the random sample of students from the
Milwaukee public schools, controlling for individual fixed
effects.11 Note that I use the test scores of those selected to
attend a choice school, whether or not the student ever
enrolled in a choice school or eventually returned to the
Milwaukee public schools. I show these results for two
reasons. First, making vouchers available is the only policy
instrument open to policymakers. If the state of Wisconsin
decides to provide educational vouchers to all low-income
students, not all will take advantage of the program and
not all who enroll will remain in it. In the extreme case in
which no students actually use the vouchers, even if the
choice schools are much better at educating children than
the public schools are, there will be no achievement gains
from the program. Thus, comparing the test scores of
students who are selected (whether or not they actually are
enrolled in a choice school) reflects the overall potential
gains from offering the vouchers. Second, students who
leave the choice schools may do so because they are not
flourishing there. In this case, an analysis that compares
the test scores of students who remain enrolled in a choice
school may overstate the true effect of the program.12
 The top panel of Chart 1 shows that students
selected for the choice program made yearly gains in math
achievement, particularly beginning in the second year after
application. It also reveals that both the unsuccessful appli-
cants and the students in the Milwaukee public school sample
experienced large declines in their math test scores in the
third and fourth years. The bottom panel shows the trends
for reading scores. It is clear that there are no discernible dif-
ferences in the reading test scores between the three groups.
Given that the trends for the unsuccessful appli-
cants and the students in the random Milwaukee public
schools sample are similar, Chart 1 shows that any dif-
ferences between the three existing analyses do not hinge
on the selection of a control, or comparison, group (provided
that family background is adequately controlled for). In
addition, the math results in the chart are consistent with
those reported by Greene, Peterson, and Du (1997), and
the reading results accord with those reported by Witte,
Sterr, and Thorn (1995). The fact that the math results
agree with those reported by Greene, Peterson, and Du
indicates that in these data, if one adequately controls
for student characteristics, it does not make a large dif-
ference whether one defines choice students as those
who are selected to attend a choice school or as those
who are enrolled in a choice school. In contrast, the
reading results conflict with those reported by Greene,
Peterson, and Du, largely because the authors’ results
disappear when one includes individual fixed effects.
The math results conflict with those reported by
Estimates of Math and Reading Test Scores
for Students Selected to Attend a Choice
School, Applicants Not Selected, and Students
in the Milwaukee Public Schools
Chart 1
Test scores
Source:  Rouse (forthcoming).  
Note:  The estimates control for individual fixed effects (for example, they
are corrected for ability and family background).
Years since application
4 1 3 2
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Milwaukee public school sample
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Witte, Sterr, and Thorn because of differences in our
specifications and samples.13
It is also worth noting that these data are far from
ideal for an evaluation of the choice program. The fact that
students who were not enrolled in either a choice school or
a Milwaukee public school were not included in the data
leads to concerns about nonrandom sample attrition. In
addition, because of changes in the tests administered in
the public schools, some data are imputed.14 I continue to
estimate results similar to those presented in Chart 1 when
I attempt to control for both sample attrition and data
imputations. Nevertheless, statistical techniques cannot
substitute for better data, so these data deficiencies should
be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
COMPARING CHOICE SCHOOLS WITH DIFFERENT 
TYPES OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Other studies have also found that private schools perform
better than public schools (see, for example, Coleman, Hoffer,
and Kilgore [1982a, 1982b], Evans and Schwab [1995], Neal
[1997], and Sander [1996]). Many attribute the observed
superiority of private schools to the fact that these schools
compete for students.15 However, few have attempted to look
within the “black box” of private school success to understand
why the schools may be successful. Those who have looked
point to differences in homework, curriculum, decentralized
governance, and social integration (Bryk, Lee, and Holland
1993; Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore 1982a; Coleman and
Hoffer 1987). I attempt to look more closely at the apparent
Milwaukee private-public school differences in achievement
by focusing more intensely on the public schools.16
The Milwaukee public school district consists of
approximately 145 schools. The district operates a controlled
choice program in which first-time students in Milwaukee’s
public schools, students who reach the top grade of their
school, and students desiring to transfer from their attendance
area school are required to select three schools in which they
would like to enroll. If a school is oversubscribed, selection is
based on a random lottery with preference given to children
attending the feeder schools, those with siblings already
enrolled in the school, and those living in the attendance area
or nearby (Milwaukee Public Schools 1997).
Within the district there are approximately thirty
citywide (or magnet) schools, which were created in the
1970s to facilitate desegregation. Many of these schools are
specialized, offering foreign language immersion, gifted
and talented and performing arts instruction, and Montessori,
Waldorf, and Global Learning educational approaches.
Approximately 22 percent of the total Milwaukee public
school enrollment is in citywide schools.17 Many researchers
(for example, Archbald [1995]) hypothesize that citywide
schools should be better than regular attendance area
schools because citywide schools compete for students (at
least within the district). In Milwaukee, this competitive
effect may be muted, however, because although the city-
wide schools are designed to accommodate students from
all over Milwaukee, many of them allocate over half of
their available seats to children who live close to the school
(Milwaukee Public Schools). 
Finally, a group of fourteen schools (known as
“Project Rise Schools”) whose students are predominately
minority and extremely disadvantaged were exempted from
desegregation. Instead, they were provided with extra funding
from the state. Today, these fourteen schools, along with about
seven others, participate in the Preschool to Grade 5 Grant
Program, and are known as P-5 schools;18 they enroll about
15 percent of the total public school students and 25 percent
of the elementary school students. This program provides sup-
plemental state grants to schools with high proportions of
economically disadvantaged and low-achieving students. In
theory, eligible schools are required to maintain pupil-teacher
ratios of under twenty-five to one, institute annual testing in
basic skills, identify students needing remedial education,
increase parental involvement, provide in-service training, and
conduct staff evaluations (Clancy, Toulmin, and Bukolt 1995).
In practice, the schools primarily comply with the small
class size requirement. In 1993-94, Wisconsin allocated
$6.7 million to the P-5 schools, which amounted to grants of
approximately $500 per child.19
To assess whether student achievement varies among
the different types of public schools, I estimate the effect of the
total number of years in which the student has continuously
been enrolled, or had ever been enrolled, in the particular type
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students in “regular” Milwaukee public schools and those
enrolled in choice, citywide, and P-5 schools. I control for
family background and student ability by including individ-
ual fixed effects, as described above.
Chart 2 shows the results for math scores.21 The
differences in the top panel do not adjust for student abil-
ity and family background; those in the bottom panel do.
Consider, first, the results that do not adjust for family
background. These figures suggest that students in the city-
wide schools consistently score higher than students in the
regular public schools, and the gap increases with the
cumulative number of years the students have been
enrolled in the citywide schools. This finding is consistent
with much of the existing evidence on magnet schools (for
example, Blank [1990], Crain, Heebner, and Si [1992],
and Gamoran [1996]). In addition, the results indicate that
although the students in the P-5 and choice schools have
lower scores (than students in the regular public schools) in
the first year, the rate of increase is (roughly) similar to that
for students in the magnet schools.22
Notice, however, the effect of controlling for student
ability and family background using individual fixed
effects, as shown in the bottom panel of Chart 2. Once
student characteristics have been accounted for, the gap in
math scores between the citywide students and regular
public school students disappears. At the same time, the
gap between those in the P-5 and choice schools becomes
large and statistically meaningful. Significantly, there is no
difference in the math achievement gains of students in the
P-5 and choice schools.
Chart 3 presents the reading score results. Again,
before controlling for student ability and background (with
individual fixed effects), I find that students in citywide
schools score substantially higher than students in the regular
public schools and in the choice schools (top panel). Students
in the P-5 schools make incremental yearly gains, although
these gains are not statistically distinguishable from zero. The
bottom panel again shows that once one adjusts for individual
The Difference in Math Test Scores between Choice,
Citywide, and P-5 Schools, and “Regular” Milwaukee
Public Schools
Chart 2
Difference in math test scores
Notes:  The top panel does not control for individual fixed effects; the
bottom panel does. A P-5 school participates in Milwaukee’s Preschool
to Grade 5 Grant Program.  
Cumulative years in choice, citywide, and P-5 schools
4 1 3 2 5


















The Difference in Reading Test Scores between Choice,
Citywide, and P-5 Schools, and “Regular” Milwaukee
Public Schools
Chart 3
Difference in reading test scores
Notes:  The top panel does not control for individual fixed effects; the
bottom panel does. A P-5 school participates in Milwaukee’s Preschool
to  Grade 5 Grant Program. 
Cumulative years in choice, citywide, and P-5 schools
4 1 3 2 5
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Notes:  Ratios are enrollment-weighted. A P-5 school participates
in Milwaukee’s Preschool to Grade 5 Grant Program. 






fixed effects, students in the citywide and choice schools are
found not to have faster reading test score gains than students
in the regular public schools.23 In contrast, students in the P-5
schools have substantially faster gains in reading than those in
the other public schools and choice schools.
Overall, these results suggest that the observed
superiority of the citywide schools in Milwaukee can be
attributed to the fact that they enroll higher achieving
students.24 The results also suggest that students in the P-5
schools have math score gains equal to those of students in
the choice schools and reading score gains that are greater.
After four years, the P-5 and choice test score advantage is
about 0.37 of a standard deviation for math; the P-5 advan-
tage in reading is about 0.16 of a standard deviation.25
These gains are relatively large for education productions,
and are comparable to the effects from the Tennessee class
size experiment (Finn and Achilles 1990; Krueger 1997).
What might explain the fact that the P-5 and choice
schools generally outperform the other public schools? While
there are undoubtedly many factors that might explain this
result, one relatively easily observed characteristic that they
have in common is a small pupil-teacher ratio, which is often
used as a proxy for class size.26 Chart 4 shows the average
pupil-teacher ratio by school type.27 The average pupil-
teacher ratio in the P-5 schools is 17.0 students per
teacher; the average ratio in the choice schools is 15.3.
Both are significantly smaller than the pupil-teacher ratios
in the regular and citywide public schools.
To gauge the extent to which small pupil-teacher
ratios might explain the achievement effects of the choice
program, I first estimate the effect of the choice schools on
test scores relative to all Milwaukee public schools. Next, I
estimate the achievement gains that accrue to students
enrolled in public schools with low pupil-teacher ratios
relative to those in public schools with higher pupil-
teacher ratios.28 This latter analysis uses only students
enrolled in the Milwaukee public schools. I then compare
the two sets of achievement gains. A finding that the gains
among the public schools with low pupil-teacher ratios
largely correspond to the gains in the choice schools pro-
vides indirect evidence that low pupil-teacher ratios (and
perhaps small class sizes) may explain part of the observed
private-public school achievement differentials (Chart 5).29
The solid line in the top panel of Chart 5 shows
the math test score growth of students in the choice schools
relative to students in all Milwaukee public schools. These
results essentially replicate those presented in the top panel
of Chart 1. The dotted line shows the math test score pro-
gression of students in public schools with small pupil-
teacher ratios relative to students in public schools with
larger pupil-teacher ratios. The two lines almost entirely
coincide. The results for reading are in the bottom panel.
In this case, the two lines do not overlap to the same degree
as those for math; however, none of the gaps is significantly
different from zero, either.
These results indicate that lower pupil-teacher
ratios (or class sizes) may explain the differential math gains
by students in the choice schools (as well as the lack of
gains in reading). They do not, however, explain why the
P-5 schools appear to perform so well in reading. It is
important to understand that this exercise does not prove
that low pupil-teacher ratios explain either the public-private
school or the P-5–regular school achievement difference.
Rather, this exercise highlights the need for a much better
understanding of why the choice schools in Milwaukee
may, on average, be better (at least in teaching mathematics)
than the average public school, and why the P-5 schools
appear as strong as the choice schools and stronger than the70 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998
other public schools. I have looked at pupil-teacher ratios
because they are a readily available measure that partially
defines the P-5 schools and because representatives from the
choice schools I contacted emphasized their small class sizes.
However, there are likely to be other equally compelling
school-specific factors that may explain the differences. More-
over, it is critical that we understand these factors better if we
are to improve education for America’s urban youth.
CONCLUSION
The results in this paper suggest that there are significant
differences between the public schools in Milwaukee. In
particular, students who attend a subset of schools distin-
guished by, among other characteristics, their small class sizes
and additional state funding have test score gains in math that
keep pace with those in the private schools that participate in
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. In addition, this
subset of schools has significantly faster reading score gains
than either the choice or the other public schools.
In order to evaluate these results fully, one must
consider not only student achievement, but costs as well.
Evidence that students performed just as well (or better) in
the choice schools, but at lower cost, would indicate that
private schools are more efficient. Unfortunately, I know of
no definitive accounting of the cost differences between the
two sectors for providing the same mix of services. Some
researchers argue that private schools cost 50 to 60 percent less
than public schools (for example, Hoxby [1998]). Coleman
and Hoffer (1987) report that, among high schools, overall
private school expenditures are 91 percent of public school
expenditures. However, both “other, non-Catholic” and “high-
performance” private schools spend more than public
schools.30 In addition, Levin (forthcoming) presents an
extremely rough estimate of the costs in the Milwaukee public
and choice schools. He concludes that the choice schools may
have only slightly lower costs (for the same services). There-
fore, particularly compared with the P-5 schools, the choice
schools may not have an unambiguous efficiency advantage.
Clearly, a careful comparison of the educational costs in public
and private schools would make an invaluable contribution to
the literature and the public policy discussion.
This analysis provides direct evidence that not all
public schools are created equal. In addition, not all private
schools are created equal. For example, while the overall
results suggest that students in the choice schools have no
faster gains in reading than do students in the (average)
Milwaukee public school, Hispanic students in the choice
program—90 percent of whom attend one private school—do
make significant gains in reading.31 If we really want to “fix”
our educational system, we need a better understanding of
what makes a school successful, and we should not simply
assume that market forces explain sectoral differences and are
therefore the magic solution for public education.
Can Small Classes Explain the Choice School
Achievement Effects?
Chart 5
Difference in test scores
Notes:  The chart depicts the difference in test scores between choice schools
and all Milwaukee public schools, and between public schools with small
pupil-teacher ratios and public schools with larger pupil-teacher ratios
(controlling for ability and family background with individual fixed effects). 
Milwaukee public schools with small classes are those with a pupil-teacher
ratio less than or equal to seventeen students per teacher. 
Cumulative years in choice or public school with small classes
4 1 3 2 5
Math Test Scores




















0APPENDIX FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / MARCH 1998 71
APPENDIX
Table A2
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES AND INDIVIDUAL FIXED-EFFECTS 
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF CITYWIDE, P-5, AND CHOICE 
SCHOOLS ON MATH AND READING TEST SCORES
Dependent Variable











Currently enrolled in citywide
   school 4.240 0.233 2.565 -1.033
(1.105) (1.054) (1.000) (0.986)
Enrolled one year -1.375 0.347 1.471 1.245 
(1.094) (1.308) (0.996) (1.226)
Enrolled two years -1.037 -0.882  1.062  0.504
(1.212) (1.411) (1.091) (1.336)
Enrolled three years 2.139 -0.986 3.018 0.121
(1.401) (1.533) (1.264) (1.438)
Enrolled four  years 3.448  -0.114 3.003 0.883 
(1.975) (1.878) (1.765) (1.755)
Enrolled five years 5.620   0.978 1.279 -1.134
(3.142) (2.683) (2.679) (2.392)
Currently enrolled in P-5 school 2.446 1.810 3.529 0.439
(0.850) (0.688) (0.762) (0.649)
Enrolled one year -5.271 -0.234 -5.871 1.441
(0.741) (1.743)  (0.670) (1.623)
Enrolled two years -1.821 5.067 -3.773  4.342
 (0.885) (1.777)  (0.798) (1.653)
Enrolled three years 0.363  6.820 -3.388 3.328
(1.071) (1.893)  (0.953) (1.759)
Enrolled four years 1.271 4.799 -2.483  2.885
(1.367) (2.054)  (1.159) (1.914)
Enrolled five years 3.417  5.180 -0.779 3.361
(2.014) (2.372) (1.746) (2.222)
Currently enrolled in choice school 0.338 -2.631 0.297 -1.558
(1.739) (1.391) (1.547) (1.331)
Enrolled one year -3.683 4.450 -2.428 2.321
(1.656) (1.762) (1.484) (1.673)
Enrolled two years -2.999 6.766 -3.853 1.519
(1.844) (1.839) (1.651) (1.743)
Enrolled three years -1.592 7.054  -1.139 1.458 
 (2.193)  (2.045) (1.980) (1.943)
Enrolled four years 1.980  9.721 -2.336 0.549
(3.113) (2.560) (2.797) (2.421)
Memo:
Control for individual fixed effects? No Yes No Yes
R2 0.057 0.819 0.039 0.795
Number of observations 10,186 10,186 10,224 10,224
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications include a constant 
and dummy variables indicating the grade level of the student when he or she 
took the test. The math score regressions include a dummy variable indicating if 
the test score was imputed. “Enrolled” is the total number of years the student 
has continuously been enrolled, or had ever been enrolled, in the particular type 
of school. A P-5 school participates in the Preschool to Grade 5 Grant Program.
 
Table A1
ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOLS CLASSIFIED










Kilbourne Lincoln Center for the Arts
LaFollette* Lloyd
Lee* MacDowell
Martin Luther King, Jr.* Meir Elementary School
Palmer Milwaukee Education Center
Phillis Wheatley* Milwaukee French Immersion
Pierce* Milwaukee German Immersion
Riley Milwaukee Spanish Immersion
Siefert* Morgandale











Note: A P-5 school participates in the Preschool to Grade 5 Grant Program.
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Table A3
INDIVIDUAL FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT
OF CHOICE SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS WITH SMALL PUPIL-
TEACHER RATIOS ON MATH AND READING TEST SCORES 













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Currently enrolled in school
  with small pupil-teacher ratio -0.232 -2.383
   (1.111) (1.022)
Enrolled one year 1.333 3.542
(1.360)  (1.254)
Enrolled two years 3.725 3.821
(1.518)  (1.401)
Enrolled three years 4.585 3.778
(1.727)  (1.593)
Enrolled four years 5.851 3.463
(1.985)  (1.829)
Enrolled five years 6.332 4.247
(2.294) (2.101)
Currently enrolled in choice school -3.459   -2.312  
(1.365) (1.297)
Enrolled one year 4.584  2.926 
 (1.734)  (1.651)
Enrolled two years 6.707  1.992 
 (1.813)  (1.713)
Enrolled three years 6.810  1.781 
 (2.012)  (1.903)
Enrolled four years 9.269  0.749 
 (2.526)  (2.376)
Memo:
R2 0.816 0.795 0.819 0.803
Number of observations 10,186 10,224 7,171 7,241
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications also include a constant 
and dummy variables indicating the grade level of the student when he or she 
took the test, and individual fixed effects. The math score regressions include a 
dummy variable indicating if the test score was imputed. The regressions in 
columns (1) and (2) compare the choice schools with all Milwaukee public 
schools; those in columns (3) and (4) include only the Milwaukee public 
schools. “Enrolled” is the total number of years the student has continuously 
been enrolled, or had ever been enrolled, in the particular type of school.ENDNOTES
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The author thanks Alan Krueger and Michele McLaughlin for useful
conversations and Howard Fuller for helping her to classify (and understand) the
Milwaukee public schools. Michele McLaughlin also provided expert research
assistance. Any errors are the author’s.
1. For excellent descriptions of the program, see Witte, Thorn,
Pritchard, and Claibourn (1994) and Witte, Sterr, and Thorn (1995).
2. As a result, the schools participating in the voucher program are not
representative of the typical private school, since only 21 percent of
private schools are nonsectarian (U.S. Department of Education 1996).
However, until the constitutionality of whether religious schools can
participate in voucher programs has been decided, the experience in
Milwaukee will be relevant for other cities considering such reforms.
3. I obtained this information by calling the five schools enrolling the
largest proportion of choice students. Combined, these schools enroll
over 95 percent of the choice students.
4. Originally, the private schools in the choice program were only
allowed to admit up to 49 percent of their students as part of the
program; this level was raised to 65 percent in 1994. In addition, the
number of students who could participate in the choice program was
originally limited to 1 percent of the Milwaukee public school
enrollment in the first four years but was increased to 1.5 percent in
1994. Given the total enrollment in the Milwaukee public schools, there
could be a maximum of only about 1,000 students in the program at any
one time.
5. The term control group is generally reserved for randomized
experiments, while comparison groups are developed from survey or
administrative data.
6. In most other settings, the comparison would show that students in
private schools outperform those in public schools.
7. In principle, if one had measures of all the characteristics in which
students in the choice schools and students in the public schools differed,
one could simply control for these and generate the true effect of the
program. The problem, however, is that one is never sure that every
characteristic has been controlled for, and indeed we rarely have measures
of all (relevant) aspects of the students and their parents. With
application lotteries, one does not need these measures.
8. One must control for the application lotteries because applicants to
some schools were more likely to be selected than applicants to other
schools.
9. There are several places where there could be slippage between the
actual lotteries and the imputations. For example, children with siblings
who are already enrolled in a choice school are exempted from the lottery,
children can apply to more than one school at a time, and the Greene,
Peterson, and Du (1997) imputation assumes that a child’s race
completely determines the school to which he or she applies. In addition,
Witte (1997) expresses concern that the choice schools may have abused
the permitted exclusions in order to have more control over which
students they enrolled.
10. Another way to think about this diagram is that it represents the test
score trajectories for both students in the absence of the choice program.
11. The test scores used in this paper are the normal curve equivalent
scores of the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills. See Rouse (forthcoming) for more
information about the sample.
12. See Rouse (1997) or Rouse (forthcoming) for an elaboration of these
points.
13. The fact that the individual fixed-effects strategy can accommodate
students missing prior test scores appears to explain a significant portion
of the difference in our results.
14. Beginning in 1993, there was no “total math score” (from the Iowa
Tests of Basic Skills) for a substantial percentage of students in the
Milwaukee public schools. Therefore, I predict (or impute) the total score
from the subset of students in the Milwaukee public schools who took the
entire battery of math tests (see Rouse [forthcoming] for more details).
15. Others have argued that the observed private school effect is due to
the selection process that leads higher achieving students to attend
private schools. That is, they argue that the researchers have not
controlled for all of the differences between the students in the private
schools and the comparison group of students in the public schools. (See,
for example, Cain and Goldberger [1983], Cookson [1993], Goldberger
and Cain [1982], Murnane [1984], and Witte [1992]).
16. Ideally, I would also disaggregate the achievement gains by the
individual choice schools. However, the state of Wisconsin has asked that
such an analysis not be undertaken in order to preserve the confidentiality
of the choice students.
17. This is my calculation, based on the Common Core of Data for 1991-92.
18. See Table A1 in the appendix for a list of the schools categorized as
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19. This is my calculation, based on the Common Core of Data for
1991-92.
20. I estimate the effect of being enrolled in—rather than being selected
to attend—the different types of schools because the results in Rouse
(forthcoming) suggest that the analyses yield similar results. In addition,
estimating the effect of being selected to attend the different types of
public schools (and estimating the effect of  “years since application”)
does not make as much sense.
21. The underlying coefficient estimates and standard errors for Charts 2
and 3 are in Table A2 in the appendix.
22. The gap between students in the P-5 and regular public schools
becomes statistically significant in the third year. The gap for the choice
schools is not statistically significant.
23. These results differ from those reported by Archbald (1995), who
found that students in the Milwaukee magnet schools scored higher on
math and reading tests than those enrolled in the attendance area schools.
24. Not all citywide schools perform equally. In particular, when these
schools are divided into “gifted,” “language immersion,” “special program”
(such as Waldorf, Montessori, or Global Learning), and “other”—and
individual fixed effects are included—the students in the language
immersion schools have substantially faster gains in reading than students in
all other types of schools, and students in the gifted schools have significantly
slower gains in mathematics than students in the regular schools. Because in
some years the number of students in some of these school categories is small,
these results should be regarded as tentative.
25. I used the within-sample standard deviation of 19 for this
calculation. Nationally, the standard deviation for normal curve
equivalent scores is 21.
26. Although highly correlated, the pupil-teacher ratio does not always
directly correspond to the average class size. Rather, the two measures
diverge as intraschool variation in class size increases due, for
example, to special and compensatory education (Boozer and Rouse
1997). To illustrate, the average pupil-teacher ratio in the choice
schools is 15.3 students per teacher; however, the schools’ average
class size is 23.6 students. Unfortunately, data on average class size for
the Milwaukee public schools were not readily available.
27. The estimates of the pupil-teacher ratios for the choice schools are
based on the schools I contacted. I estimated the pupil-teacher ratios for
the public schools using the Common Core of Data for 1991-92.
28. Schools with low pupil-teacher ratios have ratios less than or equal
to seventeen to one. I chose seventeen because it is the maximum pupil-
teacher ratio in the choice schools I contacted. According to this
criterion, 43 percent of all Milwaukee public schools and 52 percent of
the P-5 schools are considered to have low pupil-teacher ratios.
29. See Table A3 in the appendix for the estimated coefficients and
standard errors.
30. Other, non-Catholic private schools spend 38 percent more than
public schools, while high-performance private schools spend 131 percent
more than public schools. Expenditures in Catholic private schools,
however, are lower than those in public schools. The fact that Catholic
school costs differ from those in other types of private schools may reflect
lower teacher salaries and greater in-kind subsidies (including facilities)
from the Catholic church.
31. These results are not reported here but are available from the author
on request.REFERENCES
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